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In the St1pre111e Court of the
State of Utah

RONALD RALPH OLSEN by his
Guardian Ad Litem, Ralph E. Olsen,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SHELDON T. W ARWOOD, BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF THE AL~PINE
SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Body Corporate; CLIFTON R. CLARK, CLARENCE D. ASHTON, VICTOR C. ANDERSON, THOMAS PO·WERS, and
THOMAS A. B-ARRATT, Members of
the Board of Education of the Alpine
School District, a Body Corporate,
Defendants and Respondents.

CASE
NO. 7789

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF CASE

Plaintiff brought this action against the defendants to
recover a judgment against the defendants because of per~
sonal injuries sustained by the plaintiff being run over by
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a school bus owned by the Board of Education of the Alpine School District and operated by the defendant, Sheldon T. Warwood. The injury occurred on February 17,
1949, at about 12:30 p.m. about four miles north of Provo,
Utah County, Utah, as or just after the plaintiff alighted
from a school bus belonging to the defendant school district.
There is no conflict in the evidence as to the existence
of the following facts:
At the time involved in this litigation the Board of
Education of the Alpine School District owned and operated a school bus which was used to trans.port school pupils
to and from school (Tr. 128) ; On February 17th, 1949, just ·
after 12:00 o'clock noon, the defendant Sheldon T. Warwood, who was employed to operate one of the school buses
of the defendant Board of Education, pursuant to his duty
called at the Page or Edgemont School and there took on
a bus load of six-year-old school children, among whom was
the plaintiff in this action (Tr. 58, 83, 138).
The defendant, Sheldon T. Warwood, stopped the bus
near the Edgemont Church for the purpose of permitting
some of the children, including the plaintiff, to get off the
bus. Immediately after the plaintiff alighted from the bus
he was run over by the rear dual wheels of the bus and sustained ~very serious injuries which left him in the hospital
for 19 days and confined him in bed until the later part
of May, or more than three months (Tr. 111). The na·
ture and extent of the injury sustained by the plaintiff was
describec1 in detail by one of the attending doctors. A num·
ber. of X-rays ·were taken of the injuries which were received in evidence (Tr. 7 to 21).
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There is a conflict in the evidence as to the exact location and condition of the place where the plaintiff was
injured, and also as to the facts and circumstances that existed immediately before he was injured.
Plaintiff called as witnesses two of the children who
were on the bus and who claimed that they saw how the
plaintiff was injured. One of such witnesses was the plaintiff and the other was Marjorie Ferguson, both of whom
were six years old at the time in question and both of whom
were examined by the court as to their competency to testify. The examinations made by the court as to competency of the plaintiff to testify will be found in Tr. 53-57,.
The examination of the court as to the ·competency of the
\vitn~ss, Marjorie FergtlSon to testify will be found in Tr.
77 to 81. To enable this Court to pass upon what plaintiff
claims was prejudicial error in giving .certain instructions to
the jury, it will be necessary for the Court to have in mind
the evidence touching the manner in which it is claimed by
the parties that the injury to the plaintiff was brought about.
The plaintiff, in substance, testified:
That on February 17, 1949, about five minutes after
12 oclock noon, the defendant picked up the plaintiff and
other children to take them home. That the bus arrived
at the Edgemont Church about 12:30; that Mr. Warwood
was in the front of the bus on the left hand side driving the
bus (Tr. 58); that at the time plaintiff got out of the bus
there were three or four children on the bus, including the
plaintiff (Tr. 59) ; that before the plaintiff went to get off
he was sitting on the bus right behind the driver; that l\1arjorie Ferguson was sitting on the right hand side near the
front (Tr. 60); that the day he was hurt the bus stopped
iq front of the Edgemont Church; that there was sno\v on
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the ground; that when Mr. Warwood stopped the bus at
the church he said, "Hurry and get out, I have got some
more kids to pick up today." That when the bus stopped
Lewis got out and then Shirley got out, and then I went
to get out. While I was getting a good footing he took off
(Tr. 61). But he had only one foot out when he took off.
and "I spun around and flew under the bus, and then I
tried to get out from under it."
"Well how did you try to get out from under it?"
A. "Dig my heels in the ice and push myself out."
Q. "Then what happened as you were pushing yourself to get out from under the bus?"
A. "The wheels passed over me."
Q. "Which wheels?"
A. ''The -dual wheels on the back."
Q.

That. Mr Warwood picked him up and put him in the .
bus af~er he was run over (Tr. 62). That when he got
home Warwood carried him in the house and when he took
him in the house his mother was there and Mr. Warwood
stated to his mother that the child had been hit by. tl:te bus
and ''I told you kids to stay away from the bus," and mother
said, in substance, "Well, I don't think that it is necessary .
to discuss that right now, I think the important thing is
to contact his father and get an appointment with the doctor. (Tr. 64 and 74). · On cross-examination he testified that
at the time he was injured he was not running towards the
bus and trying to catch hold of the side of it (Tr. 75).
Marjorie Ferguson was called as a witness by the plaintiff, and testified in part as follows: That she remembers ·
the day that plaintiff was hurt; that Mr. Warwood stopped
in front of the Edgemont Church to let plaintiff out (Tr.
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85). But \vhen he stopped Mr. Warwood said something
like this, "Hurry and get off here, I have other loads to get
or other children to pick up, or something like that, I don't
remember." That Shirley Cluff got off first, and then Louis
I vie and then Ronny (plaintiff). That she was sitting by
the railing at the first seat from the door where you go out;
that she could see the steps that are used in going out of
the bus from Where she sat; that she saw Ronny (plaintiff) as he was leaving the bus; that he wasn't completely
off the step when Mr. Warwood started up; that she saw
him grab for the bus, I guess brace himself to pull his other
leg out, but the bus started up and such a jolt I guess he
didn't quite have time and the bus run over him (Tr. 86).
That she saw him lying on the ground after the bus run
over him (Tr. 87); that when she saw Ronny (plaintiff)
fall she said, "Oh, there is Ronny"; that she felt a bump
after the bus started up, "I said what was that?" and Mr.
Warwood said, "I don't know," and then she poked her
head out of the window and saw plaintiff lying on the ice
and snow (Tr. 88). Marjorie Ferguson was recalled and
testified that on the day that the plaintiff was injured the
snow where the bus stopped was higher than me, and that
the snow bank was a little bit farther than the length of
her arm from the bus door (Tr. 102). The plaintiff was
also recalled and testified that where he got off the bus
the snow was about 30 inches high (Tr. 104) and that the
snow bank was about the length of his arm from the bus
(Tr. 105).
Ralph E. Olsen, the guardian ad litem of the plaintiff~
testified that he went to the place where the plaintiff was
injured on the night of the day that he was injured. That
the snow had been pushed back from the highway and \vas
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so high that you couldn't stand and jump over it in lots
of places (Tr. 24). That there was a raise of a foot or ten
inches; that the snow was a good two feet deep in front
of the Leo Hansen. property (Tr. 27). That in front of the
church the snow was about 15 inches high built up against
the fence (Tr. 28).
The defendant, Sheldon T. Warwood, testified in part
as follows: That on February 17th, 1949, a little after 12
o'clock, he picked up some children at the Edgemont school,
among them the plaintiff. That he stopped at Stubbs Lane
where he·let Ronald and the other two, the boy and the gir~,
out, that the snow at the Stubbs Lane had been pushed
back so the people could go up that road (Tr. 138). That
he told the children to get clear of the bus; that· he opened
the door for the children to get out and they were standing a good . five feet away from the bus when he closed the
door to start up again; that as he turned to go out on the
highway he looked through the side. view mirror to ·see if
there was any oncoming traffic. When he did so he could
see somebody laying on the ground; at that time I thought
they was fighting, when kids start fighting we try to stop
them. .That there was the boy and girl standing there by
him; that he stopped the bus and went to where the plaintiff was laying and picked him up and carried him to ·the
bus and took him home; that when he picked plaintiff up,
he said the bus ran over him (Tr. 140). Mr. Warwood denied that he reprimanded the plaintiff, as testified to by
his mother (Tr. 179).
The evidence further shows that the bus that was being driven by the defendant Warwood at the time plaintiff
was injured was 29 feet 5 inches long. It was painted yellow; it is a full 7 feet:10 inches wide, the sides are 18 inches
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and the lower step used in going in and out of the bus is
12 inches from the ground (Tr. 155). A number of photographs \Vhich defendant Warwood claims to have taken of
the place \'ihere the accident occurred on Feb. 20, after the
accident \Vere offered and received in evidence, as were also
a number of pictures of the bus that was being used at the
time the plaintiff was injured.
Shirley Cluff, a witness, called by the defendant, testified in part as follows:
Q. "Do you recall the day that Ronny Olsen was hurt
by the bus?"

A. "I know that he was hurt, but I can't remember,
hardly."
Q.

"vVhat can you remember about it?"

A. "I can remember the winter that the bus stopped
by the church and I was way up there after he got run
over." (Tr. 187).
Over objection of counsel for the plaintiff, counsel for
the defendant was permitted to ask these questions on the
claim that he ~as seeking to refresh her recollection (Tr.
189).
Q. "No\v I want you to listen right close because what
I am going to do right now is ask you as near as I -can what
I asked you then when you were home with your mother,
and then I am going to repeat the answers that were taken
down, as -near as I can. Do you remember whether or not
I asked you this? 'Shirley"-speaking to you that time, 'you
didn't see him before the bus ran over him?' Now I am
talking about Ronny. Now did you see him before the bus
ran over him?'" (vVitness shakes head).
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"Your answer is no to that?" (Witness nods head)~
"And then your answer to that, you said no, and
then do you remember me asking you this question here:
'Was he holding onto the bus or trying to get hold of the
bus?' and then you answered 'No, he was running towards
it.' Do you remember telling me that he was running towards the bus just before the accident happened?"
A.. "A huh uh."
Q. "And do you rmember me asking you again-running towards the bus?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "And then I asked you this question, 'Do you know
where he was running towards it?' and your answer 'No,
he used to just hold it to slide and just slide along with it.'
Do you remember telling me that? that he used to just hold
it and slide?"
A. "Uh huh."
Q. "Your answer is yes to that?" (Witness nods head).,
Q..
Q.

MR. HANSEN: May it please Your Honor, I don't
know whether she really understands me here or not."
"Hiad you seen Ronny hold _onto the bus before
and slide along with it Wh~n it started out?"
A.. "I don't know whether he did, but there were some
other kids done that" (Tr. 190).
Q.

On cross-examination, she testified that she did not
see Ronny hanging onto the back of the bus the day he was
hurt; that when she got off the bus she walked to the front
of the bus. and that she didn't go back to where Ronny w~s
hurt '(Tr. 192).
We, of course, are mindful that it is not the province
of this Court in this case to pass upon the weight that should
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be given the evidence, and we have cited the foregoing tes-

timony for the purpose of directing the attention of the
Court to the testimony ( vie\ved most favorably to the defendant) upon which the trial court gave certain instructions to the jury which \Ve contend \Vere erroneous and prejudicial to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment appeal~
from and the order refusing to grant plaintiff a new trial
upon the following grounds:
POINT ONE

THIE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST NUMBERED 1 (R. 72 and 199) AND IN GIVING IN LIEU
THEREOF INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 4 AND 5 (R. 90 and 91).
POINT TWO

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THAT
PART OF INSTRUCTION NUMBERED 7 WHEREIN
THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED THAT ''IN. OTHER
WORDS, YOU CANNOT RETURN A VERDier IN FA\
VOR OF TilE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THIE D·EFENDANT UNLESS THE NUMBER OF J·URORS REQUIRED TO RE.A.CH A VERDI·CT AGREE UPON THE
SAME ACT OR UPO·N THE SAME F AlLURE O·R FAIL,.
URES TO ACT." (R. 201-202 and 225).
POINT THREE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO TBE
JURY THAT PART OF INSTRUCTION NUMBERED 9
WHEREIN THE JURY WAS INSTRfUCfED THAT ''IF,
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THEREFORE YOU FIND FR:OM THE EVIDENCE THAT
AFTER THE PLAINTIFF RONALD OLSEN AND THE
OTHER CHIIJDREN HAD BEEN DISCHARGED FROM
SAID VEHICLE AND THAT THEREAFTER WHEN
SAID VE'HICLE STARTED IN MOTION RONALD OLSEN RAN TOWARDS THE SIDE OF THE BUS NEAR
THE RIGHT WHEEL AT A TIME AND IN A PLACE
WHERE DEFENDANT CQULD NOT SEE HIM-" (R.
202-204 and 224).
POINT FOUR
THE TRIA:L COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCfi6N NUMBERED 11 (R 204 and 226).

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
Plaintiff requested the trial court to include in its instructions to the jury the following:
"You are instructed, members of the jury, that
it was the duty of the defendant to exercise a high degree of care to enable the plaintiff to alight and get
from the bus in safety. The degree of care required is
such as a very prudent, careful and competent person
would exercise under similar circumstances.. A failure to exercise such care constitutes negligence". (R.
72).
In lieu of the requested instruction the court instructed the jury that the defendant was required to use such
care as a reasonable and prudent person would use under
like conditions and circumstances (Instruction No. 9, R.
94-95).
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There is some conflict in the authorities as to the degree of care that is required of the driver of a school bus.
Some of the cases hold that the driver of a school bus is a
private carrier and as such is required to use only ordinary
care. Such is the holding of the District Court of Appeals
of California. Shannon et al v. C;entral Gaither Union
School District, 23 Pac. (2d) 769. Foster v. Elmer, 158
Pac. (2d) 978. So far as we are able to ascertain, the, question has not been decided by the Supreme Court of California ..
On the other hand, it is held by the Supreme Court of
Washington in the case of Phillips v. Hlardgrove et al, 161
Wash. 121; 296 Pac. 559, that upon grounds of public policy.
and in conformity with principles of law applicable to common carriers and to operators of elevators that the operator of a school bus is required to exercise the highest degree of care. In the Washington case just cited, the court
quotes at some length from other cases from Washington
and from t~e Supreme Court of the United States wherein
it is held that a common carrier of passengers is held to
the highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation of the means of transportation being used.
Some of the cases dealing with the question of the degree of care required of the driver of a school bus seem to
take a somewhat middle ground. For example, in the case
of Burnett v. Allen, 114 Fla. 489; 154 So. 515, it is said that
the driver of a school bus is required "to use every reasonable precaution and care for the safety of such children
as to prevent any harm or danger to them." While such
language is not the same as that sanctioned by the authorities in instructing a jury as to the degree of care required
of a common~ carrier, the effect thereof is substantially the
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same. It is, of course., the general rule that greater care
is required where children of tender years are involved
than in the case of adults.
It will be noted that in the instructions given in this
case, the court merely instructed the jury that they could,
among other matters, take into consideration the age of
the children. Such instruction, however, did not enlighten
the jury as to what, if any, additional care the driver of the
bus was required to take because the children he was transporting were only six years of age
The law is well settled that a common carrier of pas..
sengers is required to use a high degree of care for the
.safety of its passengers. The degree of care has been variously expressed as ''a high degree of care,'' ''the highest
degree of care, prudence and foresight-the greatest possible
care and diligence," "the utmost care and diligence," "ex..
traordinary care and caution." See 13 C. J. S. Sec. 678,
pp, 1255-56, and cases there cited.
This Court is committed to such doctrine. Taylor v.
Bamberger Electric R. Co., 62 Utah 552; 220 Pac. 695.
Christensen v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 35 Utah 137; 99
Pac. 676. The same doctrine is thus stated in 10 Am. Jur.,
.page 163, Sec. 1245:
"In general, however, carriers of passengers are
required to exercise the highest degree of care, vigilance and precaution for the safety of those it undertakes to transport, and is liable for the slightest n~g
ligence~''

Numerous cases which support the text are collected
in foot notes to the text above quoted. The same degree
of care required of common. carriers is required of the op-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
erators of elevators. 13 C. J. S., page 1270, Sec. 687, and
cases there cited. It is there said:
"While the owner of .a passenger elevator operated
in a building for carrying persons up and down may
not be a carrier of passengers in the sense that he is
bound to serve the public, yet his duty as to protecting
the pasengers in his elevator from danger is the same
as that applicable to common carriers of passengers
by other means, and he is bound to do all. that human
care, negligence and foresight can reasonably suggest
under the circumstances and in view of the character
of the mode of conveyance adopted, to guard against
accident and injuries resulting therefrom and a failure
in this respect will constitute negligence rendering him
liable." See also 13 C. J. S., page 1386, Sec. 734.
We have a statute 1943, 75-7-24, which provides that:
''The minimum uniform educational program to
be provided in the various districts of the state shall-·_
include a school term of nine months; the employment
of legally certified teachers; the transportation to and
from school of all pupils living .more than two and one·half miles from school, or provision towards such transportation of an amount equal to the allowance there-·
after made for_ the apportionment of the equalizationfund.''
-Provision is made in U. C. A., 1943, 75-7-27, for payment out of taxes the expenses of transporting children to
and from school.
While we do not contend and in our objections
refusal of the court to give the requested instruction
ing the degree of care required of the driver of a
bus, we did not claim that the operator of a school

to the
touchschool
bus is
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a common carrier within the meaning of our Public Utilities
Act (U. C. A., 1943, 76-4-25). We do most earnestly contend that every reason that has prompted the courts torequire common carriers to exercise a very high degree of
car in transporting passengers is applicable to the driver of
a school bus that is engaged in carrying children six years
of age to and from school.
The fact that a school bus is not a common carrier certainly does not justify the conclusion reached by some
courts that it is a private carrier. The principal distinction
between a comon carrier and a private carrier is that the
former holds himself out as being willing to carry all who
apply, while a private carrier is one who does not SQ; hold
himself out, but undertakes to render service pursuant to
a special contract between the carrier and the person desiring the service. Generally the degree of care required of the
two is not the same, although some authorities require the
highest degree of care and skill for the safety of a passenger from a private carrier. Mahony v. ~ansas City R. Co.,
254 S. W. 16; 286 Mo. 601; 228 S. W. 821.
The primary basis for distinguishing between the degree of care required of a common carrier and a private
carrier seems to be that the former having held himself
out as being able and willing to render service to all who
apply, by such holding out, the law, on grounds of public poUcy requires such carrier to use the highest degree of care.
The person who seeks the services of a public or common
carrier may rely upon the fact that being a common or public carrier he has a right to demand the highest degree: of
care without the ne·cessity of either making an investigation
to ascertain whether or not such a carrier is competent or
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entering into a contract that such carrier will use the highest degree of care.
On the other hand, one who employs a private carrier
has it \Vithin his po\ver and it is his responsibility to em- ·
ploy \Vhomsoever he may choose and to enter into a eon- .
tract requiring the degree of ·care required of a common
carrier or requiring the private carrier to insure safe transportation or requiring the carrier merely to use ordinary
care. A child who is required by law to attend school, who
has no choice as to ho\v or by whom he is to be transported
to and from school and who is being transported by one·
\Vho is paid with money received from taxation is in no
sense a private carrier. On the contrary, every reason that
can be advanced to support the doctrine that a common
carrier of passengers should be and is held to the highest
degree of care applies to the operator of a school bus. Indeed, the reasons that might be advanced for requiring tl1.e
highest degree of care of the driver of a school bus. are
stronger and more in harmony with public policy than those which require such degree of care on behalf of a ·common
carrier. A six-year-old school child has no ·choice as to the·
one who is his transporter to and from school. He or his
parents is indirectly compelled to pay for such service
Whether he uses it or not. No such requirement is exacted
on· behalf of a common carrier.
The driver of a schood bus under the laws of Utah,
while not compelled to transport all persons who present
themselves, is by law required to transport all children who·
fall within the class designated by the law. Unlike a private carrier, he cannot carry only those children he chooses
to carry. Nor may the Board of Education lawfully trans- ,
port some children and refuse to ·transport other children·
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similarly situated. A school board must treat all children
similarly situated alike. While a school bus is not a common carrier, it is certainly a public, as distinguished from
a private carrier, and every principle of public policy that
requires the ·exercise of the highest degree of care by a
common carrier applies to the operator of a school bus.
POINT TWO

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THAT
PART O·F INSTRUiCTION NUMBER 7 WHEREIN HE
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT "IN OTHER WORDS,
Y.OU CANNOT RETURN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THlE DEFENDANT
UNLESS THE NUUMBER OF JURORS REQUIRED TO
REACH A VERDICT AGREE UPON THE SAME Acr
OR ACTS, OR ·UPON THE SAME F AlLURE TO ACT (Tr.
92-93).
The plaintiff objected to the foregoing lnstruction because it is not the law as applied to the evidence in this
case (Tr. 207).
As we understand the foregoing· Instruction, it means

that if three of the jurors found that the defendant was
negligent because he did not give the plaintiff sufficient
time to get off the bus before starting the same and two
found that the defendant was negligent because. the defendant stopped the bus. too near the f~nce and snow in
front of the church and the other four jurors found that
neither starting of the bus or the stopping it before the
snow piled up at the church was sufficient to bring about
the· injury complained of but it required the operation of
the two· acts to cause· the injury to the plaintiff, then and
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under such a state of facts a verdict must be rendered for ·
he defendant. \Ve confess that \Ve have never heard of
such an instruction having been approved· and in our some\Vhat limited search we have not been able to find an authority so holding.
We have found cases such as Sportman vs. Wabash R ..
Co., 177 S. W. 703, 191 Mo. App. 463, where it is held that
where there are two acts of negligence charged, one of
which renders the defendant liable and the other does. not,
the jury must find in favor of the plaintiff on the negligence properly chargeable against the defendant to sustain
a verdict. We also find that in such cases as Sessions vs.
Pacific Improvement Co., et al, 206 Pac. 653, and Merrill
vs. Kohlberg, 155 Pac. 824, that where two counts are alleged a general verdict is suffi,cient to support a judgment.
We can readily understand where two entirely distinct and
independent acts of negligence are relied upon there may be
some basis for a jury being required to find as to each act
and that if they are unable to agree upon which of the, independent a:c1s caused the injury complained of, a verdict
for the plaintiff would be improper. In this case and in ·
many cases negligence resulting in injury is c_aused by a
combination of several acts. Under the Instruction now
being discussed, the jury could not, as we understand the
Instruction, find for the plaintiff unless the required number of jurors were in agreement as to the act or various
acts which caused the injury.
A discussion touching the necessity of a majority of
the judges of an appellate court to agree upon the grounds
for the reversal or affirmance of a judgment will be found
in 5 C. J. S. 1314 et seq., 4 C. J. 1121, and cases there cited.
We can understand that where a case is reversed and a new
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trial ordered in an action at law, it may be necessary to
have a majority of the court agree upon the particular error that is the basis for a reversal as otherwise· the trial
court will probably be compelled to repeat the error. To
illustrate, if three members of the five members of an appellate court say that the trial court correctly gave Instruction No. 1 and three members say that the trial court correctly gave Instruction No. 2 and three members say that
the trial court correctly gave Instruction No. 3, but two
members say that. the trial court was in error as to each
of such Instructions it is easy to understand why the judgment should be affirmed even though all five members
should be of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed for different reasons. However, even in such case
some of the authorities hold that the judgment should be
reversed. (See eases 'Cited in footnote to the text above
cited). The case of Wilcox vs. Wunderlich, 73 Utah 1; 272
Pac. 207, lends support that if a majority of an appellate
court holds that a trial court was in error in the trial the
cause should be reversed even though the members of such
appellate court are not in agreement as to the grounds that
required a reversal.
By an·alogy, if a majority of a jury are agreed that a
defendant was negligent and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury, we can conceive of no sound
reasOn why the jury may not properly find a verdict for the
plaintiff even though they may not be agreed upon th~ particular act of negligence of which the defendant was guilty.
POINT THREE
THlE -TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION .. NUMBER NINE, WHEREIN THE JURY
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WERE INSTRUCTED THAT "IF THEREFORE Y·01U
FIND FROM THE EVIDENCE THAT AFTER THE
PLAINTIFF, RONALD OLSEN AND THE OTHER CH[LDREN HAD BEEN DISCHARGED FROM SAID VEHICLE AND THAT THEREAFTER WHEN SAID, VEHICLE STARTED IN MOTION RONALD O·LSEN RAN
TOWARD THE ·SIDE OF THE BUS NEAR THE RIGHT
vVHEELS AT A. TI~IE AND IN A PLA·CE WHERE DEFENDANT COULD N·OT SEE illl\I THEN YOUR VERDICT l\IUST BE IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND
AGAINST THE· PLAINTIFF (Tr. 93-94).
The plaintiff objected to the foregoing Instruction and
particularly to that portion thereof wherein the court
informed the jury that if they found that Ronald Olsen
ran to\vards the side of the bus near the right wheels and
if defendant did not expect such p.ction on the part of plaintiff, it's because there is no · evidence or pleading which sho\vs that plaintiff ran towards the bus (Tr. 202 to 203).
The law seems to be well settled that, "The scope of
an Instruction in a particular case, whether civil or ·criminal, is to be determined not alone by the pleadings therein,
but also by the evidence in support of the issues; and even
though an issue is raised by the pleadings, it is not proper
to give an Instruction thereon ·where there is no basis for
it in the evidence. An Instruction not based on the evidence
is erroneous in that it introduces before the jury facts not
presented thereby, and is well calculated to induce them
to ·suppose that such state of facts in the opinion of the·
court is possible under the evidenc~ and may be considered
by them." (53 Am. Jur., Sec. 579, Pages 455-456). Nu~
merous cases from the Federal and State Courts are cited
in footnotes 17 and 18 to the text above cited .. · The cases
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of Griffin vs. Prudential Ins. C'o., 102 Utah 563; 133 Pac.
(2d) 333; 144 A. L. R. 1402; Smith vs. Clark, 37 Utah 116,
106 Pac. 603, from this jurisdiction are there cited.
Among the numerous other Utah cases where the same
doctrine is announced are: Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah
366; 270 Pac. 349; Manti City Savings Bank v. Peterson, 33
Utah 209; 93 Pac. 566; Ohlinkamp v. Union Pacific R. R. Co.,
24 Utah 232; 67 Pac. 411; Hillyard v. Bair, 47 Utah 561; 155
Pac. 449; Smith v. Cannady, 45 Utah 521; 147 Pac. 210;
Armstrong v. Larsen, 55 Utah 347; 186 Pac. 97; Davis v.
Midvale City 56 Utah 1; 18~ Pac. 74; Tyng v. ConsolidatedLorraine Inv. Co., 37 Utah 304; 108 Pac. 1109; Dimmick v.
.Utah Fuel Co. 49 Utah 430; 164 Pae. 872; Sagers v. International Smelting Co., 50 ·Utah 423; 168 Pac. 105; Cand..
land v. Mellen, 46 Utah 519; 151 Pac. 341; \nerdi v. Helper
State Bank, 57 Utah 502; 196 Pac. 225; Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah 256; 9 Pac. (2d) 183.
Heretofore in our statement of the ease, we have directed the attention of the Court to the testimony of the
witness, Shirley Cluff, who was called by the defendant. It
will be noted that under the pretext of refreshing her memory, counsel for the defendant asked her a number of leading questions, among which was:
Q. ''Now I want you to listen right close because what
I am going to do right now is to ask you, as near as I ·can,
what I asked you then when you were home with your
mother, and then I am going to repeat the answers that
were taken down, as near as I can. Do you remember
whether or not I asked you this-'Shirley' speaking to you
that time-'You didn't see him before the bus ran over
him?" Now I am talking about Ronny. Now did you see
him before the bus ran over him?' " (Witness shakes head).
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"Your ans,ver is no to that? (Witness nods head)
and then your answer to that, you say 'No' and then do you
remember me asking you this question here? 'Was he holding onto the bus or trying to get hold of the bus?' And
your ans\ver 'No, he \vas running towards it.' Do you remember telling me that he was running toward the bus just
before the accident happened?"
A. "'Huh uh."
Q. "And do you remember me asking again: 'Running
to\vards the bus?' ''
A. "'Yes."
Q. "And then I asked you this question: 'Do you know
where he \vas running towards it?' and you answered: 'No,
he used to just hold it to sl~de and just slide along with it.'
Do you remember of telling me that-that he used to just
hold it and slide?"
Q.

A.
Q.

"Uh huh.';

"Your answer is yes to that."
MR. HANSEN: ''May it please Your Honor, I don't
know whether she really understands me here or not.''
Q. "Had you seen Ronny hold onto the bus before
and slide along with it when it started out?"
A. "I don't know whether he did, but there were some
other kids done that" (Tr. 190).
There were other questions asked and statements,made
before the jury such as ''if she were older, I think I .. would
ask leave to impeach her," (Tr. 191), which were calculated to impress the jury with the idea that the plaintiff
may or was running towards the bus just before he was
injured. It was bad enough to ask such leading questions
and make such statements before the jury, but such. matter
may have been overlooked were it not for the fact that the
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court gave credence to such statements by the giving of
Instruction numbered 9.
A careful reading of the evidence of Shirley Cluff will
show that nothing can be gleaned from the testimony that
would justify a finding that the plaintiff ·was .running towards the · bus as indicated by Instruction numbered 9.
There is no other evidence that lends support to such a
fact. It will be noted from the pictures of the bus that
there is nothing on the side of the bus that plaintiff could
hold onto. It is, to say the least, extremely improbable
that the plaintiff would have run towards the bus, or if
he should that he eould get there in time to get under the
rear wheels unless he was attempting to commit suicide.
POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE·D IN GIVING

INSTRUC~

TION NUMBERED 11 IN THAT THE SAME IS ARGUMENTATIVE AND THlE COURT IN EFFECT COlVIMENTED. ON THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

In Instruction numbered 11, the court instructed the
jury in part that ''In ·weighing the evidence as to defendant's alleged negligence, it is your duty to consider it under
all of the facts and circumstances existing at the time of
the accident and not to consider it as you would in looking
back upon the events from this later date. Quite ordinarily,
individual actions in any given set of circumstances may
disclose faults and criticisms when looked back upon and
tested by cool and deliberate thinking away from the event,
which would not be apparent to a reasonable and prudent
person at the time he is surrounded by the circumstances
of the accident" (R. 95) .
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The plaintiff objected to that Instruction for the reason that the same is argumentative in favor of the defendant's claim in this case (Tr. 204).
The jury is as able to determine the relative value or effect of looking back on an event as compared with viewing
the act when it occurred as is the court. It is essentially
the province of the jury when called upon to decide questions of facts and the weight that shall be given evidence
to do so \vithout the aid or suggestions of the court. Howley v. Corey, 9 Utah 175; 33 Pac. 695; Smith v. Gilbert, 49
Utah 510; 164 Pac. 872; l\Ioore v. Utah-Idaho Cent. R. Co.,
?2 Utah 373; 174 Pac. 873. 53 Am. Jur. Page 439, Sec.
552 and cases there cited in footnotes.
It is submitted that a new trial should be granted to
plaintiff, and that he should be awarded his costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
J. RULON MORGAN
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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